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INTRODUCTION
The impact of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma on the Gulf Coast states
during the 2005 hurricane season illustrated the essential need for hospitals and
other health care providers to prepare for and respond to emergencies. Hospitals
in the paths of the storms across Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida were
forced to evacuate some patients, temporarily act outside prevailing standards of
patient care, and, in some cases, cease operations entirely. Additional hospitals that
were unharmed by the physical destruction in these and many other states saw their
patient populations swell as they absorbed hurricane evacuees, often as their
community's primary source of health care services. The significant demands for
medical care and complications associated with meeting patient needs underscore
the critical nature of hospital preparedness as a part of comprehensive emergency
response efforts?
A core component of hospital emergency planning is its ability to maintain
quality standards of care during disaster responses. This ability hinges on multiple
factors (e.g., access to medical supplies; functionality of hospital equipment,
information systems, or other services; or destruction of physical structures), but
may be most contingent on the availability of sufficient medical personnel.
Hospitals need to be able to quickly and confidently ramp up staffing to meet surge
capacity.2 Additional medical providers are needed prior to, during, and following
a disaster for hospitals to adequately function. Assuming the disaster is reasonably
predictable, such as a hurricane, supplemental medical staff is needed in advance to
help evacuate at-risk patients and prepare for emergency responses once the disaster
hits. During the disaster, medical personnel may be deployed to care for existing
patients and any new patients who were injured by the event. This can be a
tremendous challenge in cases where the disaster literally destroys the hospital
community's physical infrastructure (as was the case in New Orleans following
Hurricane Katrina). Resulting temporary impairments of equipment and
technological capabilities may necessitate more personnel to perform tasks like
hand-pumping ventilators when there is no electricity.3 Hospitals face additional
potential impacts related to an influx of new patients, the availability of fewer core
1. Adam Nossiter, Hospital Condiions in New Orleans Worsen, Aug. 31, 2005,
http://abnews.go.com/Health/HurricaneKatfia/wireStory?id=1082512 (last visited Apr. 17,
2006); Press Release, Unconventional Concepts, Inc., London Attacks May Contain Clues for U.S.
Emergency Preparedness, July 7, 2005, http://www.pmewswire.com/cgi-bin/stories.pl?ACCT
=104&STORY=/www/story/07-07-2005/0004063208&EDATE= (last visited Apr. 17, 2006).
2. Surge capacity is defined as "the number of critical casualties arriving per unit of time that
can be managed without compromising the level of care." Asher Hirshberg et al., How Does Casualy
Load Affet Trauma Car in Urban BombingIndents?AQuantitativeAnasi. 58(4)J. TRAuMA 686,691
(2005).
3. See, Nossiter, supra, note 1.
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medical personnel, and the backlog created by rescheduling the procedures of
existing patients. In cases of mass evacuation, many hospitals in an entire region
may need additional medical personnel for weeks or months to sustain basic
operations. At least two hospitals in the New Orleans area continue to seek
significant additional medical personnel even two months after the impact of
Hurricane Katrina.4
The real disaster facing hospitals in the aftermath of hurricanes or other
emergencies is their potential failure to provide quality care or meet the essential
needs of existing and new patients. These failures may implicate a host of liability
concerns. In St. Bernard Parish, Louisiana, for example, owners of St. Rita's
Nursing Home were indicted as a result of the deaths of thirty-four patients because
of the facility's failure to comply with the Parish's mandatory evacuation order.'
Allegations that medical staff may have euthanized some patients at New Orleans'
Memorial Medical Center in the days after the hurricane has led to an investigation
by the Louisiana Attorney General's Office." Increasing staffing capabilities as a
part of hospital emergency management planning is critical towards ensuring the
availability of quality care for patients and mitigating the risk of liability to the
hospital. While maximizing the use of existing core hospital personnel is a part of
disaster response, meeting surge capacity inevitably requires the assistance of skilled
and capable volunteer health professionals (VHPs), as addressed in Part I.
Deployment and use of VHPs during emergencies, however, raise other legal
challenges for hospitals. Are VHPs, who may be deployed from other states,
properly licensed to practice medicine in the host state? Do they have the necessary
credentials to practice in a given hospital? What is the extent of their privileges
4. As of November 15,2005, Ochsner Hospital and Touro Infirmary, two major health care
facilities in the New Orleans area, were still requesting the assistance of hundreds of specialized
health professionals through the Emergency Management Assistance Compact (EMAC). These
facilities, whose staff had been greatly depleted in the aftermath of the hurricane, reported having
to operate well below capacity due to insufficient medical personnel at their facilities. Personal
communications from Ochsner Hospital and Touro Infirmary, EMAC Teleconference, Nov. 15,
2005 (on file with author).
5. CNN, Nursing Home Owners Face Charges, Sept. 13, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/13/katrina.impact/index.html (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
6. Carl Quintanilla, Eutbanasia Alleged at New Orkans Hospital, Oct. 17, 2005,
http://msnbc.msn.com/id/9732216/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
7. An essential element of emergency preparedness is the ability of a hospital to increase
surge capacity and supplement its medical capabilities as part of an emergency response plan. A
hospital's ability to accommodate a sudden flood of large numbers of patients requiring medical
care determines its surge capacity. See, Daniel P. Davis et al., HospitalBed Surge Capad In the Event
of a Mass-Casualo Inddent, 20(3) PREHoSP. & DISASTER MED. 169 (2005), available at
http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu/20-3%2OPDFs/Davis.pdf. Surge capacity refers to "the number
of critical casualties arriving per unit time that can be managed without compromising the level of
care." Hirshberg, supra note 2, at 691. In addition to bed and medical supply availability, the
availability of properly qualified medical staff is an important aspect of surge capacity. See, i.
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within the hospital? These concerns challenge hospitals because of the potential for
liability related to negligent medical care given by improperly qualified health care
professionals at their facilities. During non-emergencies, hospital administrators
and staff work hard to prevent harms to patients through medical negligence. Their
obligations to prevent these harms during emergencies are compounded by the
disaster itself. Assessing liability is not easy, for example, when the standard of care
during triage may change substantially in the context of an emergency! Regardless
of these liability concerns, the need for VHPs to meet surge capacity during
emergencies is clear because the alternative (i.e., improperly caring for patients
because of a failure to use available VHPs) is untenable.
To assist hospitals and other medical providers in fulfilling patient needs
during emergencies, federal and state governments have organized efforts to make
qualified VHPs available to hospitals (and other providers) more rapidly. Volunteer
medical personnel may be directly deployed by the federal government through
initiatives such as the National Disaster Medical System (NDMS). Federal
volunteer recruitment efforts related to the medical response to Hurricane Katrina
in the Gulf Coast states resulted in over 33,000 responses.' These efforts were,
however, significantly criticized by states and localities because of significant delays
in actual response."
Alternatively, states are developing their own volunteer registries with federal
funding and technical assistance. Following lessons learned from the terrorist
attacks on September 11,2001, the federal Public Health Security and Bioterrorism
Preparedness and Response Act of 200211 authorized the Department of Health and
Human Services (HHS) to create a state-based program to develop emergency
systems for advance registration of volunteer health professionals (ESAR-VHP).'
President Bush recently acknowledged the emergence of these state systems in his
administration's plan to address pandemic flu.' 3 These state-based electronic
systems seek to pre-qualify volunteers through advance verification of their
8. See, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & QUAIATY, ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE
IN MASS CASUALTY EVENTS: BIOTERRORiSM AND OTHER PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCIES, availabk
at http://www.ahrq.gov/research/altstand/ (last visited Nov. 18, 2005) [hereinafter ALTERED
STANDARDS OF CARE].
9. See, U.S. DEP)T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV. HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND RELIEF
PERSONNEL WORKER PAGE, https://volunteer.ccrf.hhs.gov (last visited Nov. 18,2005).
10. The Latest on Katrina'sAftermath, Bush Says Much Work Remains, Deflects.Questions on Disaster
Response, CNN.com, Sept. 13, 2005, http://www.cnn.com/2005/US/09/07/news.update/
index.htm1 (last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
11. See, Pub. L. No. 107-188 (2002).
12. Id at § 107.
13. Bush Unveils $7.1 Billion Plan to Prepare for Fl Pandemic, CNN.com, Nov. 2, 2005,
http://www.cnn.com/2005/HEALTH/conditions/11/01/us.flu.plan/ (last visited Mar. 31,2006).
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credentials, licenses, accreditations, and hospital privileges of VHPs.4 Volunteers
deployed through these systems are, in essence, pre-vetted.
Hospitals and other health care entities may access information from these
systems during a public health emergency or mass casualty event to quickly privilege
additional staff or verify a VHP's license or credentials." Thousands of additional
VHPs were successfully deployed through these systems during Hurricanes Katrina,
Rita, and Wilma, even though many states' systems are still in early stages of
development. 6 Additionally, the deployment of VHPs through volunteer systems
may dispel some liability risks that hospitals face by improving their capacity to
quickly, accurately, and satisfactorily check the qualifications of outside medical
personneL' 7 Yet, hospitals may still face civil liability for the use of VHPs under
two major themes (as discussed in Part II): (a) the doctrine of corporate neg~gence (under
which a hospital may be held liable for its own failures to adopt appropriate policies
and procedures to protect patients); and (b) vicarious l'abih'v (through which a
hospital may be held liable for the negligent actions of VHPs performed within the
scope of their duties). These two themes are particularly important for hospital
entities because, unlike individual volunteers during emergencies, they may not
enjoy special immunity or indemnification protections through emergency laws or
other mechanisms for liability regarding the provision of medical care.
Despite the potential for liability arising out of the use of VHPs, and the
limited protections hospitals enjoy, hospitals may engage in several proactive
strategies to effectively manage their risks. Part III summarizes these strategies in
three main areas:
(1) Planning and training to meet surge capadty. One of the most effective strategies
to limit liability is to prevent the conditions from which it may attach. Hospitals
that engage in advance planning to meet surge capacity in response to emergencies,
and require existing (and potential volunteer) health personnel to be trained in the
methods of delivering quality care in the context of emergencies via triage, are
14. HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., EMERGENCY
SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-
VHP)-LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES 10 (2005), available at http://www.hrsa.gov/esarvhp/
legregissues/default.htm (last visited Nov. 13,2005) [hereinafter LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES
REPORT].
15. See, HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERv., EMERGENCY
SYSTEMS FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP)
PROGRAM INTERIM TECHNICAL AND POLICY GUIDELINES, STANDARDS, AND DEFINITIONS, v. 2,
S 3.2.3, 25 (2005), availabk at http://www.hrsa.gov/esarvhp/guidelines/default.htm (last visited
Mar. 31, 2006).
16. HEALTH RES. & SERV. ADMIN., DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., BIOTERRORISM
HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS: EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER
HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP)-PROGRAM STATUS, available at
http://www.hrsa.gov/esarvhp/. (last visited Nov. 18, 2005).
17. LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 14, at 42.
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taking meaningful, responsible steps toward significantly reducing their liability
during emergencies;
(2) Impkmentingst'ictredentiahngproceduir. Volunteer registries like ESAR-VHP
are designed to readily provide hospitals with access to available, pre-vetted VHPs
for real-time responses to emergencies. This service is invaluable, but hospitals may
also need to supplement these efforts through additional credentialing procedures
designed to expeditiously validate the qualifications of VHPs specifically assigned
to treat patients; and
(3) Divesting responibihiyfor VHPs. Statutory and other legal mechanisms do
not fully insulate hospitals from all types of liability related to the use of VHPs
during emergencies. However, hospitals can divest some of their responsibility
through affirmative steps including specific informed consent forms for patients
and specialized agreements with VHPs, their host hospitals, or other entities.
Collectively, these proactive measures not only help reduce the potential for
significant liability of hospitals in the use of VHPs during emergencies, but they can
also improve patient care by facilitating the deployment of essential medical
personnel when and where they are most needed.
I. THE INTER LAY BETWEEN HOSPITALS AND VOLUNTEER HEALTH
PROFESSIONALS DURING EMERGENCIES
Hospitals are complex institutions that provide a multitude of health services
to the population. The cumulative, orchestrated efforts of administrators, super-
visors, and a variety of skilled professionals are necessary for these institutions to
function properly. A major emergency or disaster will inevitably test the capacity
of a hospital's administrative structure and workforce to respond to the expanded
health care needs of the affected populations. A predictable consequence of any
significant public health emergency is the surge of dozens, hundreds, or even
thousands of patients that may require immediate medical assistance in hospital
settings. This influx of patients may tax the ability of local hospitals and other
medical facilities to provide adequate care. 8  The incorporation of new
professionals into the operational structure of a hospital requires careful planning,
adept management, and rigorous oversight, particularly during an emergency when
circumstances may be stressful, novel, and chaotic. It is imperative that hospitals
plan for these scenarios, assess potential areas of workforce shortage and surge
capacity needs, and establish the means to increase the numbers of qualified health
personnel available to meet surge capacity during various types of emergencies. The
sections that follow explain the circumstances in which hospitals may need the
18. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FEDERAL RESPONSE PLAN, EMERGENCY SUPPORT
FUNCTION #8: HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICEs ANNEX, ESF 8-4 (Jan. 2003), available at
http://www.au.af.ml/au/awc/awcgate/frp/frpesfS.pdf (last visited Mar. 31, 2006) [hereinafter
ESF #8].
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assistance of VHPs during emergencies, discuss the available mechanisms to link
hospitals and VHPs, and describe the roles that VHPs may fill in various emergency
scenarios.
A. Hospitals' Need for VHPs in Emergencies
To meet surge capacity, hospitals may draw upon their existing workforce,
temporarily hired personnel, or VHPs. VHPs may be used in several different
capacities during a public health emergency or mass casualty incident, depending on
the nature of the incident. If the emergency involves large numbers of traumatic
injuries, VHPs may be needed to supplement hospital staff resources that have been
stretched thin or exhausted, to provide medical care for patients, or to offer mental
health support for victims and their families. Natural disasters, like Hurricane
Katrina, may result in injuries from trauma, dehydration, malnutrition, or exposure
to toxic chemicals and contaminated water. Furthermore, if existing health care
facilities are disabled, additional personnel may be needed to evacuate large numbers
of patients or provide treatment under difficult circumstances with limited medical
resources, creating a humanitarian aid crisis.19 Displaced patient populations will
also need access to medications, medical supplies, equipment, and treatment.
The utilization of any outside personnel presents the hospital with
management challenges and potential liability risks. Depending on the nature of the
emergency, the hospital's existing workforce may be depleted or be completely
overwhelmed. Irrespective of their specific training, VHPs may be asked to fill gaps
in existing services. Consequently, VHPs may not be matched appropriately to the
specific needs of health care entities, or may be asked to perform acts they are not
well trained to do, raising concerns regarding civil liability.2' These problems are
compounded by the lack of a common system to coordinate volunteer responses
at the state and local levels. During the hurricane response efforts in the Gulf Coast
region, many states aligned through communications between their ESAR-VHP
systems and with HRSA to coordinate the dissemination of VHPs to affected areas.
These efforts contributed to more effective deployment and use of VHPs, although
interoperability of these systems during a multi-jurisdictional emergency can still be
improved. Some members of Congress suggested during the hurricane disasters
that a nationally-coordinated system may help prevent duplication of efforts, waste
of resources, and delays in emergency responses.2
19. Phillip Nieburg, Ronald J. Waldman, & Donald M. Krumm, Huricane Katrina: Evacuated
Populations--Lssonsfrom Foreign Refugee Crisis, 353 N. ENG.J. MED. 1547 (2005); SUSAN F. MARTIN,
ET AL., THE UPROOTED: IMPROVING HUMANITARIAN RESPONSES TO FORCED MIGRATION 1
(2005).
20. For a complete discussion of civil liability implications, see Part II, infra.
21. Senator Obama introduced the Hurricane Katrina Emergency Health Workforce Act of
2005, S. Bill 1638, on September 8, 2005. The bill outlines a series of initiatives to provide for
federal coordination of VHP deployment and additional legal protections for VHPs. See, Hurricane
64 10 MSU JOURNAL OF MEDICINE AND LAW 57 (2006)
While the use of VHPs can present management and liability challenges, there
are several distinct advantages to their utilization during an emergency as opposed
to existing or temporarily hired personnel. Hospital managers may need additional
personnel from outside the emergency zone urgently to fill in and provide care to
an expanding patient population that may require rapid treatment, access to
medications, or even isolation (in cases of infectious conditions). Even if a hospital
staff is generally functioning well during an emergency, specialized health
professionals trained to treat patients with particular needs may still be needed.
Incorporating VHPs into the hospital may be more efficient than trying to extend
the utility of existing personnel or engaging in temporary hiring, provided that the
appropriate systems are in place to assess and verify the professional competencies
and qualifications of the VHPs.
B. Procedures for the Use of VHPs
Emergency management planning is an essential precursor to the use ofVHPs
in emergencies. Hospitals may request volunteers through multiple venues: federal
volunteer networks, state ESAR-VHP programs, entities like the Medical Reserve
Corps (MRC) or the American Red Cross, or pursuant to the state's Emergency
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system. Depending on the scope of the
disaster or emergency, VHPs may seek out hospitals and offer their services.' The
method of deployment will largely determine the scope of legal protections available
to VHPs and their affiliations (e.g., whether they are considered a federal or state
employee, an independent volunteer, or otherwise), and by extension, the civil
liability exposure of the hospital utilizing them.' Three distinct sources-
government deployments, private sector response, and spontaneous volunteers-
help facilitate the deployment of VHPs during emergencies.
Government deployments of health volunteers typically involve activating
teams of pre-registered emergency responders through federal, state, and local
mechanisms to provide medical care or other needed assistance at the disaster site
or other locations. At the federal level, deployments are governed by the National
Response Plan (NRP)24 and Emergency Support Function #8 (ESF-8), which
Katrina Emergency Health Workforce Act of 2005, S. 1638, 109th Cong. (2005), availabk at
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/D?d109:11:./temp/-bdq2s:: /bss/dl09query.html (last
visited Apr. 13, 2006). See also, JAMES G. HODGE, Jr., CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB. HEALTH,
HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE: H.R. 3736-KATRINA VOLUNTEER PROTECTiON ACT OF 2005,
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/Katina%/20-%20HR/203736.pdf (last visited
Apr. 5, 2006) [hereinafter H.R. 3736 MEMORANDUM].
22. Many of the volunteers that appeared after the September 11, 2001 attacks and
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in 2005 arrived spontaneously, i.e. without any connection to the
organized incident response system.
23. See, Part II, infra.
24. The NRP was developed by the Department of Homeland Security to establish "an all-
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grants DHHS the authority to coordinate the health and medical components of the
emergency response based on the need for assistance identified at the state or local
levels." The National Disaster Medical System (NDMS) coordinates 7,000-8,000
VHPs, organized into several different response groups,26 including Disaster
Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT).27 Federal law permits individual federal
agencies to deploy temporary health volunteers as part of an emergency response.'
For example, over 33,000 people responded to DHHS' request for medical
volunteers in response to Hurricane Katrina.29 In addition, medical personnel
deployed by MRC units3° may assist in the establishment of mobile health care
facilities and to provide care in existing facilities.3'
States may mobilize volunteer teams through their own emergency
preparedness laws and response plans.32 These teams can be deployed to other
hazards plan that provides the structure and mechanisms for national level policy and operational
coordination for domestic incident management." U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., NATIONAL
RESPONSE PLAN, 1 (Dec. 2004), availabk at http://www.dhs.gov/interweb/assetlibrary/
NRPFullTextpdf [hereinafter NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN].
25. See genera*, ESF #8, supra note 18 ("providring] coordinated Federal assistance to
supplement State and local resources in response to public health and medical care needs following
a major disaster or emergency; or during a developing, potential medical situation.').
26. See, Robert F. Knouss, National Disaster Medical System, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 49, 50
(2001), availabk at http://www.pubichealthreports.org/userfiles/I16_SUP2/116049sup.pdf.
27. DMATs are teams of health professionals trained in emergency response, who can
provide medical assistance at the site of the triggering event, before patients can be evacuated to
health care facilities.
28. See, 42 U.S.C.A, § 217b (West 2003);JAMES G. HODGE& LANCE A. GABLE, HURRICANE
KATRINA RESPONSE: LEGAL PROTECTIONS FOR TEMPORARY VOLUNTEERS UNDER A FEDERAL
DECLARATION OF PUBLIC HEALTH EMERGENCY 1 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.
publichealthlaw.net/Research/PDF/Katrina%20-%20Federal%20Temp%2OVolunt.pdf.
29. See, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., HEALTH CARE PROFESSIONALS AND
RELIEF PERSONNEL WORKER PAGE, https://volunteer.ccrf.hhs.gov/ (last visited Oct. 6, 2005).
30. MRC units are community-based units comprised of local medical and public health
professionals willing to provide volunteer assistance "during times of community need." See, MED.
RESERVE CORPS, THE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEPYT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
ABOUT THE MEDICAL RESERVE CORPS, http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/page.cfm?pageID=-5
(last visited Apr. 3, 2006). MRC units function predominantly at the local level and can be
deployed by state or local governments to augment the public response to an emergency. Id
31. During Hurricane Katrina, several MRC units were deployed to work in conjunction with
the American Red Cross to provide medical care at federally established medical contingency
stations for those in need of medical assistance following the hurricane. See, MED. RESERVE
CORPS, THE OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., MRC
RESPONSE TO HURRICANES KATRINA AND RITA-INTERIM REPORT (Oct. 11, 2005),
http://www.medicalreservecorps.gov/page.cfin PageID= 1047.
32. See, e.g., GOVERNOR'S DIV. OF EMERGENCY MGMT., TEX. DEP'T OF PUB. SAFETY, STATE
OF TEXAS EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PLAN, ANNEX H: HEALTH AND MEDICAL SERVICES, H-1
- H-2 (2002), ftp://ftp.txdps.state.tx.us/dem/plan.state/state-annex.h.pdf. Seegeneralb, MED.
RESERVE CORPS, OFFICE OF THE SURGEON GEN., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERV.,
GETTING STARTED: A GUIDE FOR LOCAL LEADERS 4 (2004), http://www.medicalreservecorps
.gov/pdf/MRCTASeries00.pdf (providing a general guide to establishing and operating a Medical
Reserve Corps unit) [hereinafter GETTING STARTED].
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states pursuant to memoranda of understanding (MOU) between states, or through
interstate compacts like EMAC, which govern emergency response efforts.33 Local
health departments also may engage in recruiting, mobilizing, and deploying
volunteers. Often, local governments handle the deployment of first responders
such as volunteer fire departments and EMS teams.' Likewise, private sector
entities play an important role in deploying volunteers during public health
emergencies and other disasters. Large, national volunteer organizations and
consortia, such as the American Red Cross 5 and the National Voluntary
Organizations Active in Disaster (NVOAD),' contribute manpower and expertise
to emergency response efforts. Other volunteer organizations, such as Catholic
Charities USA and the Salvation Army, also provide significant support.
Additionally, medical associations have organized their own disaster response
teams.3" Individual medical institutions may also assemble disaster response teams
to provide assistance to state governments as a part of emergency response efforts. 39
33. See general4, CANADIAN INTERGOVERNMENTAL CONFERENCE SECRETARIAT, INTER-
NATIONAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT ASSIsTANCE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING (July
18, 2000), available at http://www.scics.gc.ca/cinfoO0/85007918-e.html (providing "for the
possibility of mutual assistance among the jurisdictions entering into [the] compact in managing
any emergency or disaster when the affected jurisdiction or jurisdictions ask for assistance, whether
arising from natural disaster, technological hazard, man-made disaster or civil emergency aspects
of resources shortages.) [hereinafter IEMAC]; Emergency Management Assistance Compact, Pub.
L. No. 104-321 (1996) [hereinafter EMAC]. See a/so, Priscilla B. Fox, Crmss-Border Assistance in
Emergencies: The New England/Easmn Canadan Mode4 11 NEW ENG. J. INTL & COMP. L. 75 (2004),
available at http://www.nesl.edu/intljournal/voll 1 /fox.pdf.
34. See, GETTING STARTED, supra note 32, at 4; E. Brooke Lerner et al., Linkages ofAcute Car
and EMS to State and Local Pub'c Health Programs: Apphation to Pubc Health Programs, 11 (4) J. PUB.
HEALTH MGMT. & PRAC. 291,292 (2005).
35. Under the NRP, the American Red Cross is responsible for "coordinating... mass care
resources." See, NATIONAL RESPONSE PLAN, supra note 24, at 3.
36. Id at 11. ("NVOAD is a consortium of more than 30 recognized national organizations
of volunteers active in disaster relief.") See general#, NATIONAL VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS
ACTIVE IN DISASTERS, ANNUAL REPORT 2002, availabk at http://www.nvoad.org/aricles/
AnnuaLrep02.pdf (providing information regarding NVOAD's structure, goals, and mission).
37. See, CATHOLIC CHARITIES USA, DISASTER RESPONSE, http://
www.catholiccharitiesusa.org/response/index.cfm?cfid=4603538&cftoken=69474944 (last visited
Apr. 3, 2006); THE SALVATION ARMY, OUR ROLE IN DISASTER SERVICES, http://www.
salvationarmyusa.org/usn/www-usn.nsf/vw-dynamic-arrays/8214F21 A914
E09CE80256FE80071ECF1?openDocument (last visited Apr. 3,2006).
38. For example, the Orthopedic Trauma Association has established a mass casualty
response team, composed of orthopedic traumatologists, which may be deployed as part of NDMS.
See, Christopher T. Born & William G. DeLong, Organing the Orthopaedic Trauma Associaon Mass-
Casuali Response Team, 422 CLINICAL ORTHOPAEDICS & RELATED RES. 114,115.
39. One example is the DMAT teams assembled by Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions
(JHM1) within days of Hurricane Katrina to provide assistance in the response efforts. JHMI
assembled two teams that were immediately sent to the Gulf Coast region to participate in the
medical response at the request of the National Institutes of Health and the Maryland Department
of Health and Human Services. These teams were organized by the institution's Office of Critical
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Virtually all hospitals have developed their own emergency response plans to
coordinate personnel and resources. In many regions, hospitals have entered into
agreements to share staff and provide reciprocal privileges to facilitate a coordinated
medical response to a disaster.' These agreements are extremely helpful in
coordinating the movement of essential health care personnel, but do not
encompass the gamut of potential volunteer deployments. Hospitals must not only
plan for the infusion of additional VHPs through organized systems, as discussed
above, but also anticipate the arrival of numerous spontaneous volunteers during
and after an emergency. Thousands of these individuals, who self-deploy to an
emergency site or nearby health facilities to offer assistance without any prompting
from or connection to organized volunteer networks, rushed to the Gulf coast
region after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Many of them had no verification,
beyond their own personal representations, of their licensure or capabilities to
provide care, and as a result many were not fully utilized in response efforts.4 In
many cases, emergency response coordinators were forced to develop ad hoc
systems to immediately register and screen potential medical volunteers.4 2
Proper credentialing and privileging of volunteers are critical for hospitals to
determine how to best use particular volunteers and to ensure the provision of
Event Preparedness and Response and utilized to provide assistance in community hospitals and
mobile health facilities. See E-mail from Gabor Kelen, Director of the Office of Critical Event
Preparedness and Response, Johns Hopkins Medical Institutions, Director of the Johns Hopkins
Department of Emergency Medicine, toJohns Hopkins University faculty, staff, and students (Sept.
16, 2005, 11:12 AM) (on file with author).
40. The use of inter-facility Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs) to share staff and meet
surge capacity needs is a common practice in the private sector. At least sixty-nine percent of
urban hospitals have agreements with other hospitals to share resources in the event of
bioterrorism. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, HOSPITAL PREPAREDNESS: MOSTURBAN HOSPIT-
ALS HAVE EMERGENCY PLANS BUT LACK CERTAIN CAPACITIES FOR BIOTERRORISM RESPONSE,
GAO-03-924,at 13 (Aug. 2003),availabkathttp://www.mipt.org/pdf/gao03924.pdf. Often, shared
staff members are paid as temporary employees at the facility where they are providing assistance;
in other situations, their normal employer will pay their salary and receive reimbursement from the
hospital that benefited from the shared services. For example, the District of Columbia Hospital
Association maintains an agreement among its members to mutually assist hospitals in emergency
management. This agreement addresses the logistics of personnel and equipment sharing and the
transfer of patients. It also assigns credentialing responsibilities and legal liability to hospitals
receiving assistance from others. See, D.C. HosP. ASS'N, MUTUAL AID MEMORANDUM OF
UNDERSTANDING 6-10 (Sept. 27, 2001), availabk at http://www.dcha.org/EP/dchamou.pdf.
41. Following the hurricanes, health professionals appeared at numerous shelters, medical
clinics, hospitals, and mobile medical units to provide assistance and contacted state and federal
emergency management coordinators about participating in the response. Associated Press, Chaos
Hinders Efforts to Treat Kattina Survivors, MSNBC, Sept. 5, 2005, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/
9207678/; Associated Press, On an Old Baseball Field, Makesbi Medicine, MSNBC, Sept. 3, 2005
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/9189282/.
42. Id.
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quality medical care for patients in their facilities.4 3 Legal and accreditation
standards demand that health care facilities use credentialing and privileging to
assess the qualifications of all professionals, including volunteers, who practice
within their facilities." During emergencies, credentialing and privileging must
occur in an expedited fashion or may not be possible at all. Thus, advance
registration systems will be an important resource to enable hospitals to engage in
adequate expedited credentialing and privileging during emergencies. These
systems can alleviate the burden on hospitals to verify a volunteer's qualities by
providing pre-vetted information on VHPs within the system.
Recruitment of properly licensed and credentialed VHPs may necessitate
drawing from a wide array of entities and jurisdictions, including obtaining
assistance VHPs from across state lines. Therefore, the availability of cross-border
recognition of medical licenses and practitioner certification may dictate the number
of VHPs that can legally participate in the response efforts. Although license
reciprocity provisions exist under the current emergency response system through
state mutual aid agreements" and state laws,' there are no uniform legal
mechanisms that apply to all VHPs in emergencies. Consequently, emergency
planners may have difficulty recruiting VHPs from other states to mount a
comprehensive and coordinated medical response.
II. THEMES OF CIVIL LIABILITY FACING HOSPITALS
The formal organization of VHPs during emergencies through governmental
and private sectors facilitates the deployment of volunteers to hospitals during
emergencies to meet surge capacity. These volunteer programs offer hospitals and
other medical providers information and access to VHPs that are pre-vetted, and
thus ostensibly qualified to function well in an exigent environment. Yet, during the
hurricane response efforts in the Gulf Coast region, the specter of liability still
muddied the effective utilization of VHPs. In some instances, hospital systems
within and outside the region expressed liability concerns about the arrival of
volunteers. Even though the risks of liability to hospitals may be greater in not
utilizing VHPs to meet surge capacity (for example, if the failure to use qualified
43. See, JOINT COMMISSION FOR THE ACCREDITATION OF HEALTHCARE ORGANIZATIONS
(CAHO), COMPREHENSIVE ACCREDITATION MANUAL FOR HOSPITALS: THE OFFICIAL
HANDBOOK (2004) [hereinafter JCAHO OFFICIAL HANDBOOK].
44. See, LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 14, at 29-30.
45. See, e.g., IEMAC, supra note 33; EMAC, supra note 33. See also, Fox, spra note 33, at 77.
46. Some states have enacted reciprocity legislation that is not tied to emergency declarations.
Minnesota, Connecticut, West Virginia, and Illinois, for example, have enacted provisions allowing
physicians holding licenses or permits from other states to provide care within the state when
responding to an emergency. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 12.42 (2005); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 20-9(b)(3)
(1999); W. VA. CODE § 30-3-13(b)(5) (2002); 20 ILL COMP. STAT. 3305/16 (2004).
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VHPs resulted in substantial reductions in care to patients), hospitals were cautious
regarding the influx of VHPs47
In reality, hospitals' risks of liability concerning the use of VHPs exist.
General tort principles holding persons responsible for harms caused to others after
a breach of duty apply to hospitals as well as individuals.' Unlike individuals,
however, hospitals may be held liable not only for their own acts and failures, but
also for those of their health care workers. Hospitals owe duties of care to their
patients that stem from the relationship that is formed when the patients present for
care.49 Patients arrive at a hospital with reasonable expectations that the hospital
and its staff will provide adequate, competent, and quality care.' During an
emergency, a patient's expectation may change as standards of care may be altered,"'
but the duty to provide some level of care remains. If patients' reasonable
expectations are not met, either due to the hospital's mistakes or those of its health
care workers, hospitals may risk liability for resulting harms.
Of course, the need to provide quality care does not obligate the hospital to
ensure the safety of their patients against all acts of physician negligence and
misconduct. 2 Especially during emergencies, courts will not likely hold hospitals
accountable later for failures to sustain quality levels of care equivalent to pre-
emergency standards. Rather, hospitals must provide the patient a degree of
reasonable care in accordance with his or her known conditions. 3 This standard
is met when reasonable efforts are made to oversee the actions of the health
professionals practicing within the hospital.' Yet, emergency situations, such as
Hurricane Katrina, may hinder the hospital's ability to adequately oversee health
care workers (including VHPs) and the workers' ability to provide adequate care.5
Both of these limitations could potentially lead to patient injury and expose
47. See, James G. Hodge, Jr., Lance A. Gable, & Stephanie Calves, The LegalFrameworkfor
Meeting Surge Capady Througb the Use of Volunteer Health Professionals During Pubh'i Health Emegendes
and Other Disasters, J. OF CONT. HEALTH L. & POL. (forthcoming 2006).
48. Bost v. Riley, 262 S.E.2d 391, 396 (N.C. App. 1980).
49. Id.
50. Id.; see also, Moore v. Bd. of Trustees, 495 P.2d 605, 608 (Nev. 1972).
51. See, ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note 8.
52. Decker v. St. Mary's Hosp., 619 N.E.2d 537, 541 (Ill. Ct. App. 1993).
53. Id.
54. Boat, 262 S.E.2d at 396.
55. It is predictable that the standard of care to which hospitals are held as a supervisory
authority is altered during emergency situations. See, ALTERED STANDARDS OF CARE, supra note
8. If hospitals are generally not expected to direct, control, or oversee treatment in the emergency
room due to the necessity for split-second decision making (See, Greene v. Rogers, 498 N.E.2d 867
(Ill. 1986), cited in Gilbert v. Frank, 599 N.E.2d 143 (ill. App. Ct. 1992)), then it may also be
unreasonable to expect that they continue to exercise their supervisory powers during an
emergency or disaster, during which the entire hospital is essentially converted into an "emergency"
room.
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hospitals to risks of liability under two major themes: (1) corporate negligence and
(2) vicarious liability, each of which is discussed in the sections below.
A. Corporate Negligence
Corporate negligence theory can be used to hold a hospital liable on the basis
of its own acts or failures to act, and not merely for the negligence of its employees.
The theory is based on the assumption that hospitals are responsible for the general
care and treatment of their patients-6 and have an affirmative duty to supervise the
care its employees provide.5 7 Corporate negligence liability is incurred by more than
just an act of negligence by an individual for whom the hospital is responsible.
Rather, liability results when the hospital itself breaches the duties that flow from
the reception and treatment of patients.-8 In general, hospitals owe a duty to their
patients to ensure that health care is only provided within their facilities by
individuals who are competent and careful.5 9 This duty includes the need to (1)
provide adequate, safe facilities; (2) employ competent physicians; (3) oversee their
employees' care; and (4) form and enforce policies ensuring quality patient care.'
To sustain a finding of corporate negligence, courts typically require that a
hospital deviated from its standard of care, had actual or constructive notice of the
defects or actions causing harm to patients, and that its conduct was a substantial
factor in causing the harm.6' In emergency situations where VHPs may be essential
to meet surge capacity, fulfilling these duties is complicated. Nevertheless, hospitals
may still be legally responsible for failing to provide some level of adequate care if
they (1) do not have sufficient emergency management planning, (2) fall short in
meeting surge capacity during the emergency, or (3) engage in improper staff
selection, supervision, or administrative oversight.
Insufficient emergency management planning may be grounds for a finding
of corporate negligence when the hospital does not implement plans to address the
particular medical needs that exist during emergency situations. Disasters often
cause widespread injury and illness and cut hospitals off from their usual resource
channels.62 These consequences are devastating, but predictable. Hospitals must
develop emergency management plans to address how they will obtain sufficient
56. See, Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. 1984).
57. See, Darling v. Charleston Comm. Mem. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965).
58. See, Edwards v. Brandywine Hosp., 652 A.2d 1382 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (suggesting that
a hospital, itself, breaches its independent duty to its patients when it knows or should know about
the harm to its patients caused by the healthcare professionals practicing within).
59. Aldoroty v. HCA Health Serv. of Kan., Inc., 962 P.2d 501 (Kan. 1998).
60. Thompson v. Nason Hosp., 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991).
61. Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815,827 (Pa. Super. 2001).
62. See, James G. Hodge, Jr. et al, Volunteer Health Professionals and Emeqendes: Assessing and
Tran forming the Legal Enamronment, 3(3) BIosEcuRrIy AND BIOTERRORISM 216, 217 (2005).
Volunteer Health Professionals & Hosoital Liability
resources to treat patients during a disaster situation."' Even if the hospital has
engaged in advance emergency planning, it may be held liable for any resulting
deficiencies in care if it cannot effectively implement its plan's components."
Communication-based, organizational, or supervisory failures that prevent hospitals
from properly implementing their emergency plans to serve patients during an
emergency may all lead to findings of liability under corporate negligence.65
Hospitals may also face liability for their inability to meet surge capacity during
an emergency situation." In response to an increased demand for treatment after
a hurricane or other disaster, hospitals that do not or cannot call upon adequate
numbers of staff may not be able to provide reasonable care to their new and
existing patients.67 Failing to effectively utilize existing federal or state VHP systems
to meet surge capacity may be grounds for corporate negligence liability when
VHPs available through these systems would have helped the hospital provide
adequate treatment for new and existing patients. 8 Improper or delayed use of
VHP systems may also lead to hospital liability for breaches of the duty to provide
a reasonable standard of care for patients.69 Finally, the inability to meet surge
capacity may also violate the federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active
Labor Act (EMTALA) ° EMTALA requires hospitals to screen and stabilize
within their capabilities all patients who present for emergency care, even during
disasters." Nonconformance with EMTAILA requirements is a separate ground for
hospital liability via a federal cause of action.
Courts have also held hospitals liable under the theory of corporate negligence
for an individual physician's negligence if it was the result of deficiencies in staff
63. See, e.g., JCAHO OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 43.
64. See, Rauch, 783 A.2d at 827; Welsh v. Bulger, 698 A.2d 581 (Pa. 1987).
65. See, Barry R. Furrow, Fordng Rescue: The Landscape of Health Can Provider Obigations to Treat
Patients, 3 HEALTH MATRIx 31, 63 (1993).
66. See, Daniel P. Davis, et al., HospitalBedSurtge Capady In the Event ofa Mass-Casually Inddent,
20(3) PREHOSP. & DIsASTER MED. 169 (2005), availabk at http://pdm.medicine.wisc.edu/20-
3%20PDFs/Davis.pdf.
67. Meeting surge capacity includes providing an adequate supply of qualified medical staff,
beds, and medical supplies. See, Asher Hirshberg et al., How Does Casually LoadAffec Trauma Care
in Urban Bombing Inddnts?A_0uantitativeAtnabsi, 58(4)J. TRAuMA 686, 691 (2005).
68. This finding derives from hospital accreditation standards set forth under the Joint
Commission for Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations JCAHO) that implicates additional
concerns under corporate negligence liability for failing to provide adequate facilities or care. See,
JCAHO OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 43; see also, Carter v. Hucks-Folliss, 505 S.E. 2d 177
(N.C. App. 1998) (establishing propriety of considering hospital's failure to comply with JCAHO
standards as some evidence of negligence).
69. See, Marks v. Mandel, 477 So.2d 1036 (Fl. App. 3d Dist. 1985) (indicating that hospital
emergency room's failure to provide thoracic surgeon for patient in timely fashion constituted
enough evidence for the jury to rule on a corporate negligence question).
70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395(d)(d) (2005).
71. Id.
72. See, Godwin v. Mem'l Med. Ctr., 25 P.3d 273,278 (N.M. App. 2001).
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selection or supervision practices. 73 A hospital's duty of care extends to exercising
reasonable effort in selecting and retaining qualified medical professionals on its
staff.74 Accordingly, hospitals utilizing VHPs must ensure that these professionals
are properly licensed, credentialed, and privileged.75 If hospitals do not properly
investigate the qualifications of their VHPs, they may be held liable for creating a
foreseeable risk of harm to patients who may be treated by incompetent health
professionals.76
To determine whether a hospital has adequately vetted the licensing,
credentialing, and privileging of its staff members, courts typically require that it has
exercised "reasonable care."'  Even though emergency situations require hospital
personnel to act quickly and decisively, hospitals who do not verify the
qualifications of their VHPs with reasonable care may face liability for negligent
staff selection.7' Although ESAR-VHP and other volunteer systems ascertain a
VHP's credentials prior to mobilization,79 hospitals may still face liability for
negligent credentialing or privileging if they fail to verify that the VHP has been
properly vetted.' For liability to attach it must be proven that but for the hospital's
lack of care in the selection or retention of the health care provider, the provider
would not have been granted staff privileges and the patient would not have been
injured."1 In the context of VHPs, it is unclear what evidence courts might use to
73. See, Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 827 (Pa. Super. 2001). Note that the hospital's
corporate negligence liability for a staff member's negligence is direct liability for its own
administrative failures, rather than the vicarious liability that would attach based upon the
professional's status as an employee or agent of the hospital. See Section II B, infra.
74. Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168 (Wash. 1984).
75. See, Robinson v. Duszynski, 243 S.E.2d 148, 151 (N.C. App, 1978).
76. See, Megrelishvili v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 291 A.D.2d 18 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,
2002). The hospital's VHP system administrator may also be found liable for his or her failure to
adequately or properly utilize the system.
77. Rule v. Lutheran Hospitals & Homes Sec., 835 F.2d 1250 (Neb. App. 1987); see also, Mills
v. Angel, 995 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. Appl. Texarkana 1999). Cf., Wellstar Health Systems, Inc. v, Green,
572 S.E.2d 731, 733 (Ga. App. 2002) in which the court found that the provision of an otherwise
alleged "competent" practitioner, with no further indication of having satisfied licensure
requirements, was not sufficient to shield the hospital from liability.
78. See, Lopez v. Cent. Plains Reg'l Hosp., 859 S.W.2d 600 (Tex. App. Amarillo, 1993)
(recognizing that hospital's duty to exercise reasonable care in staff selection gives rise to cause of
action for negligent credentialing); Goodstein v. Cedars-Sinai Med. Ctr., 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 577 (2d
Dist. 1998) (holding that hospital may be liable to patient for negligence of physician if hospital's
failure to ensure competence of staff through appropriate selection and review procedures creates
an unreasonable risk of harm to patients).
79. Cf, LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 14.
80. See, Johnson v. Misericordia Comm. Hosp., 294 N.W. 2d 501 (Wis. App., 1980) (finding
hospital liable for negligent staff selection when it failed to "scrutinize a physician's credentials"
before approving his application for privileges and that failure to adhere to its own bylaws and
credentialing policies was breach of separate duty owed to patients).
81. See, Rose v. Garland Community Hosp., 87 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. App. 2002).
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judge a hospital's investigative efforts during disasters.'2 Courts have previously
looked at what steps are taken to ascertain credentials based on the information
available to the hospital at the time of the health care provider's approval.3
Finally, courts have also held hospitals liable for the negligence of individual
health professionals when the resulting injuries could have been prevented through
adequate supervision.84 When a hospital knows or should have known about a staff
member's inadequate care and fails to take action to prevent injury, corporate
negligence liability may attach. Although the hospital's supervisory capacity may
be compromised during emergencies, failures to review treatment practices could
subject it to liability for resulting injuries caused by an individual VHP's
negligence.' Even if a hospital has supervisory measures in place for VHPs,
deficiencies in these measures can sustain liability if the deficiencies prevent the
hospital from uncovering incompetent care. 7 For example, if a hospital's nurses
are charged with checking a patient's condition and their failure to do so results in
patient injury or death, the hospital may face corporate negligence liability for
inadequate supervision of staff s Courts are reluctant to hold hospitals liable for an
employee's negligence when existing supervisory procedures were sound and would
not have yielded evidence of any wrongdoing." However, if other circumstances
should have put the hospital on notice that the employee was likely to provide
insufficient care, hospital liability may follow.'
82. JCAHO guidelines detail the licensing, privileging, and credentialing practices that
hospitals should follow when utilizing VHPs during an emergency, so it is likely that courts will use
those suggested policies to evaluate hospitals' actions. See, Carter v. Hucks-Folliss, 505 S.E. 2d 177,
177 (N.C. App. 1998) (establishing propriety of considering hospital's failure to comply with
JCAHO standards as some evidence of negligence).
83. See, e.g., Purcell v. Zimbelman, 500 P.2d 335 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1972); Tucson Med. Ctr., Inc.,
v. Misevch, 545 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1976).
84. See, Moore v. Bd. of Trustees of Carson-Tahoe Hosp., 495 P.2d 605 (Nev. 1972)
(recognizing a hospital's responsibility for the care provided by its staff and potential liability for
injuries resulting from its careless supervision); Oehler v. Humana Inc., 775 P.2d 1271 (Nev. 1989).
85. Rauch v. Mike-Mayer, 783 A.2d 815, 827 (Pa. Super. 2001).
86. See, Lo v. Provena Covenant Med. Ctr., 796 N.E.2d 607 (App. Ct. 4th Dist. 2003)
(recognizing that hospital has independent duty to review and supervise patients' care).
87. See, e.g., Johnson v. St. Bernard Hosp., 35 Ill. Dec. 364 (Il. App. 1. Dist., 1979).
88. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem'l Hosp., 211 N.E. 2d 253 (1965).
89. See, Brown v. DePuy AcroMed, Inc., 801 N.Y.S. 2d 681 (N.Y.A.D. 4 Dept. 2005) (holding
that hospital committed no corporate negligence when doctor implanted defective screws in
patient's spine, since hospital took no part in choice of screws).
90. See, e.g., Megrelishvili v. Our Lady of Mercy Med. Ctr., 291 A.D.2d 18 (N.Y.A.D. 1 Dept.,
2002); Ward v. Lutheran Hosps. & Homes Soc. of Am., Inc., 963 P.2d 1031 (Alaska 1998) (ruling
that hospital's knowledge of prior malpractice suit or disciplinary proceedings against physician is
sufficient proof that hospital should have known a physician would act negligently).
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B. Vicarious Liability
In addition to the liability via corporate negligence, hospitals are also at risk of
liability based directly on the VHP's individual negligence. Under the theory of
vicarious liability, the negligent acts of a health care provider may be directly
imputed to the hospital in which the care is given.9' The theory of respondeat
superior provides for vicarious liability when a negligent health care provider is an
employee or an agent of the hospital and has acted in the course of his
employment. This may seem to preclude vicarious liability for a volunteer's
negligence because the individual may not be considered an employee or even an
agent of the hospital. However, courts in some states have used the theory of
ostensible agency to hold hospitals vicariously liable for injuries to patients who
seek care through a hospital's emergency room, and not from any particular
physician.92  Thus, a hospital may potentially be liable for a VHP's negligent
treatment of patients if (1) an employment or agency relationship is found,93 or (2)
patients look to the hospital rather than a particular provider for care.94
The legal theory of respondeat superior looks to the existence of a formalized
employment or agency relationship. It extends liability to employers based on an
assumption that the employer has control over the actions of its employees." The
level of control exerted by the employer will determine the extent of this liability.'
Typically, only negligent acts undertaken within the "scope of employment" are
subject to liability.9" Although demonstrating an agency relationship may appear
relatively simple, courts have set a high standard for its determination. Whether a
particular physician or other health care provider is considered an employee or agent
depends on the nature of his contractual agreement, 9 including the method of
payment, scheduling, training status," staff privileges,O' and degree and
91. LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 14, at 51.
92. Abraham v. Dulit, 679 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998); see a/o,Johnson v. Jamaica
Hosp. Med. Ctr., 21 A.D. 3d 881 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). Cf., Cooper v. Sisters of Charity of
Cincinnati, 272 N.E.2d 97 (Ohio 1971), an action for wrongful death where the plaintiff alleged that
the physician was acting on behalf (i.e., as an agent) of the hospital. On appeal, the court noted that
the physician was not under the control of the hospital and that the practice of medicine in a
hospital was not sufficient to create an agency by estoppel. Absent a showing of induced reliance,
the court affirmed the holding of the trial court which denied imputing liability to the hospital.
93. See, LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 14, at 51.
94. See, ia at 51-52.
95. See, id at 51.
96. See, id.
97. See, id
98. Vananan v. Milford Mem'l Hosp., 272 A.2d 718 (Del. 1970).
99. Cooper v. Binion, 598 S.E. 2d 6 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004).
100. Capps v. VaIk 369 P.2d 238 (Kan. 1962).
101. Vanaman, 272 A.2d at 718; Pogue v. Hosp. Auth. of DeKalb County, 170 S.E.2d 53 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1969); but see, Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684, 692 (W. Va. 1991) ("Where a
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magnitude of control the hospital exercises over the provider's practices.0 2 Most
courts will not hold a hospital liable for the negligence of its health care providers
based on an employment or agency relationship if the contract specifically negates
such a status.0 3 Conversely, even where a provider is on the hospital's medical
staff, an employment or agency relationship may not necessarily follow."°
Hospitals may still be subject to vicarious liability for the actions of VHPs
under the theory of ostensible or apparent agency if the patient looks to the
hospital, rather than an individual physician, to provide care.0" To demonstrate this
type of relationship between the health care provider and the hospital, (1) the
patient must reasonably rely on the belief that the health care provider is an agent
or employee of the hospital, and (2) the hospital must affirmatively hold out the
provider as an employee or agent, or knowingly permit the provider to project
herself as such."° Ostensible agency is particularly relevant in emergency situa-
tions."0 7 In the case of a medical emergency, the public is "justifiably unaware of
and unconcerned with the technical complexities"' t" that define the employment
hospital makes emergency treatment available to serve the public as an integral part of its facilities,
the hospital is estopped to deny that the physicians and other medical personnel on duty providing
treatment are its agents. Regardless of any contractual arrangements with so-called independent
contractors, the hospital is liable to the injured patient for acts of malpractice committed in its
emergency room, so long as the requisite proximate cause and damages are present.").
102. See, Qayyum v. Morehouse Gen. Hosp., 874 So. 2d 371 (La. Ct. App. 2004).
103. Cf, Darling v. Charleston Comm. Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253 (I1. 1965). In Darng the
contract between a hospital and a physician specifically denied that the physician was to be
considered an "employee," precluding liability on the basis of vicarious liability. However, the
hospital was still ultimately found liable under a different theory, that of corporate negligence.
Thus the employment contract is not a "cure-all."; see also, Cooper, 598 S.E. 2d at 6.
104. Jacoves v. United Merch. Corp., 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); Nagengast v.
Samaritan Hosp., 621 N.Y.S.2d 217 (N.Y. App. Div. 1995) (holding that mere affiliation with a
hospital and the granting of admitting privileges are not sufficient in themselves to impose liability
on a hospital on the basis of a physician's negligence); see also, Cooper, 598 S.E. 2d at 6.
105. Henderson v. Marx, 674 N.Y.S.2d 247 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998) (holding that a hospital may
still be held vicariously liable where the physician was not a hospital employee given that the patient
sought treatment from the hospital itself; Abraham v. Dulit, 679 N.Y.S.2d 707 (N.Y. App. Div.
1998).
106. Baptist Mem'l Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998); Robers v. Condell
Med. Ctr., 801 N.E.2d 1160 (Ill. App. Ct. 2003). See also, Simmons v. St. Clair Mem'l Hosp., 481
A.2d 870, 874 (Pa. Super. 1984) (holding that a hospital may be liable for the physician's actions
when (1) the patient looks to the hospital rather than the individual physician to provide him with
care, and (2) the hospital holds the physician out as its employee); Burless v. W. Va. Univ. Hosps.,
Inc., 601 S.E.2d 85, 93 (W.Va. 2004); Mejia v. Cmty. Hosp. of San Bernardino, 122 Cal. Rptr. 2d
233, 236 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 2002); Petrovich v. Share Health Plan of Ill., Inc., 719 N.E.2d 756,
765 (111. 1999); Capan v. Divine Providence Hosp., 430 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. Super. 1981).
107. See, Torrence v. Kusminsky, 408 S.E.2d 684,692 (W. Va. 1991);Adamski v. Tacoma Gen.
Hosp., 579 P.2d 970,979 (Wash. App. 1978); Mduba v. Benedictine Hosp., 384 N.Y.S.2d 527,529-
30 (A.D. 1976).
108. Clark v. Southview Hosp. & Family Ctr., 628 N.E.2d 46,53 (Ohio 1994), itedin McGill
v. Newark Surgery Ctr., 756 N.E.2d 762, 773 (Ohio Ct. Comm. Pl. 2001).
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relationships between the hospitals and its medical professionals."° Given the very
nature of an emergency, which emphasizes the need for rapid receipt of care, the
public "has every right to assume and expect that the hospitalis the medical provider
it purports to be."'". During disaster responses, few patients presenting for care will
specifically request an individual physician. Instead, patients may arrive at the
hospital with the expectation that they will receive some general medical assistance
that the hospital can provide. Under this branch of vicarious liability, if a VHP is
recruited to meet surge capacity during the emergency, his or her negligence can
expose the hospital to some risks for liability. Thus, this theory serves to equalize
the balance of information and provide the patient with an outlet for recovery
related to negligent medical care.
In the case of VHPs who assist temporarily during disaster or emergency
responses, the method by which they are recruited may affect their particular status
as an employee or agent of the hospitals they support. As discussed in Part I, VHPs
may arrive at a hospital as federal or state government workers or as private sector
actors through organized systems like ESAR-VHP, private organizations (e.g.,
MRC, American Red Cross), or even spontaneously."' Each of these methods may
define the VHP's status differently and establish a distinct relationship between the
VHP, the state or federal government, and the hospital."2  VHPs that arrive
spontaneously, outside of the hospital's specific solicitation for help, may not
initially be considered employees of the hospital, even assuming they are assigned
some function upon arrival. However, depending on how they are utilized, they
may have the appearance of being an agent of the hospital, thus raising liability
concerns. Physicians dispatched via state programs may also have the appearance
of agency with their recipient hospital hosts. In many cases, the hospitals' view and
administration of these VHPs, regardless of the circumstances of the VHPs' arrival,
may be authoritative as to their employee or agency status. Thus, the route by
which VHPs arrive to provide care, and how the hospitals receive them, may affect
their legal status as employees or agents, and ultimately the risk of vicarious liability
for the hospitals in which they temporarily practice.
C. Liability Protections for Hospitals as Compared to VHPs
Hospital concerns about potential liability risks under theories of corporate
negligence and vicarious liability could be allayed if their liability were eliminated or
curtailed during emergencies, as is the case for many individual volunteers.
However, few legal protections exist to completely exempt hospitals from
109. McGill, 756 N.E.2d at 773.
110. Clark, 628 N.E.2d at 53 (emphasis added).
111. See, Part I.B supra.
112. Id.
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negligence liability related to the administration, use, and actions of VHPs. Laws
and regulations at the federal and state levels typically provide significant legal
protections for VHPs responding during an emergency, but these legal protections
rarely extend to hospitals and other organizational entities providing health care and
services. Disparities between available legal protections for volunteers and for
hospitals are rooted in the evolution of these protections. Most of the legal
protections available to volunteers were implemented to encourage individual,
altruistic behavior during emergency situations and to protect those who volunteer
their time and effort to assist others from liability or other harms. Hospitals and
other health care facilities, which are required by law and expected by society to
provide quality care regardless of the situation, are not always viewed as needing
similar incentives."1 3 However, some hospitals may enjoy state liability protections
in their roles as government entities or emergency care providers through specific
grants of immunity during public health emergencies, thus gaining sovereign
immunity because of their status as public institutions. In addition, Congress is
currently seeking to further limit health care liability during hurricanes and other
disasters." 4 These provisions may serve to reduce the hospitals' liability risks in
certain situations but are collectively sparse in application.
The scope of liability protections for hospitals is much narrower than that of
VHPs, but hospitals are not devoid of safeguards. VHPs may receive licensure
reciprocity, extended workers' compensation coverage, and immunity from civil
liability by virtue of their participation in an organized emergency response effort."5
Several categories of legal provisions may grant civil liability protections to
individual volunteers, including Volunteer Protection Acts,"6 Good Samaritan
laws," 7 and emergency response provisions."' Although these particular provisions
typically do not extend to health care entities," 9 there are several notable exceptions.
In Oregon, for example, designated emergency health care centers enjoy immunity
as state agents for any claims arising out of the provision of uncompensated medical
care in response to a declared emergency."2 Minnesota law allows its governor to
grant immunity to organizations and individuals providing health care services
113. See, DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS (2000).
114. See, Katrina Volunteer Protection Act of 2005, HR 3736, 109th Cong. (2005) (the bill
has passed in the House, and is currently in the Senate awaiting a vote); Hurricane Katrina
Emergency Health Workforce Act of 2005, S.B. 1638, 109th Cong. 2005.
115. See, James G. Hodge, Jr., et al., Volunteer Health Professionals and Emergendes: Assessing and
Transforming the LegalEnvimnment, 3(3) BIOSECURITY & BIOTERRORISM 216 (2005).
116. Federal Volunteer Protection Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-19 (1997); 42 USC § 14501
et. Seq. (2004); see also, VA. CODE. ANN. § 44-146.23 (2005).
117. See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.037 (West 2005).
118. See, e.g., TEX. Gov'T CODE ANN. § 421.061 (2005).
119. Id
120. See, OR. REV. STAT. % 401.5.5, 401.657, 401.667 (2003).
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during a declared emergency when good faith acts or omissions cause harm during
emergency care, advice, or assistance.12 1 In Hawai'i, the Department of Health is
statutorily empowered to enter into agreements with health care providers, including
health care entities, to control disease epidemics requiring more physical or
personnel resources than the department itself can provide. 1 22 When acting
pursuant to such an agreement, these health care entities are not liable for any
personal injuries or property damage resulting from the performance of their duties,
absent willful misconduct' 23
Emergency response laws often adopt a more expansive approach to legal
protections-in some cases all responders, even those that receive compensation,
may qualify for legal protections. Still, the vast majority of these provisions exclude
liability protections for entities and organizations providing health care services.
States that have incorporated relevant provisions of the Model State Emergency
Health Powers Act (MSEHPA) may protect hospitals from liability if they are under
contract with the state or providing medical assistance at the state's request during
a state-declared public health emergency.'24 MSEHPA details steps for states to
declare a public health emergency and bestows upon the state special powers,
including liability immunization, once it has done so."2 During a state-declared
public health emergency, hospitals could thus be insulated from many types of
liability arising out of their use of VHPs pursuant to the MSEHPA.
Hospitals and other health care entities may also receive some protection from
civil liability claims pursuant to sovereign immunity or targeted statutory provisions.
Sovereign immunity protects government entities, and in some cases government
contractors, from civil liability by essentially removing the legal routes through
which they may be sued. Under the broadest conception, these entities are thus
effectively immune from any civil action. Hospitals run by or affiliated with the
state government may benefit from this protection. Some courts consider city- or
county-run hospitals state entities and therefore immunize them from potential
liability.s Other courts have ruled that hospital administration is a corporate
121. MINN. STAT. § 12.61 (2005). These protections do not apply in cases of "malfeasance in
office or willful or wanton actions." Id.
122. HAw. REV. STAT. 5 325-20 (2004).
123. Id.
124. MODEL STATE EMERGENCY HEALTH POwERS AcT (MSEHPA) § 804(b) (Ctr. for Law
& the Pubs. Health at Georgetown and Johns Hopkins Univs. 2001), availabe at
http://www.publichealthlaw.net/Resources/ModeUaws.htm (last visited May 15,2005). Note that
as of June 30, 2005, thirty-seven states had incorporated MSEHPA's provisions. Id
125. Id.
126. See, Cabelkav. Comanche County Hosp., 87 P.3d 1101 (Okla. Civ. App. Div. 32003); see
also, Liberty Nat. Life Ins. Co. v. Univ. of Ala. Health Servs. Found., 881 So. 2d 1013 (holding that
operation of hospital by state university grants sovereign immunity). But see, O'BTrien v.
Rockingham County, 120 A. 254 (N.H. 1923) (distinguishing between counties and incorporated
towns or cities in terms of the nature of governmental and corporate powers they possess and
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undertaking and thus not within the realm of state action or protected by sovereign
immunity. 127
While most states have retained sovereign immunity for government-affiliated
institutions, some states have greatly reduced or even eliminated this protection.
Washington State, for example, has completely abrogated sovereign immunity for
state actions. 128 As a result, the state and its affiliated employees and institutions
face significant exposure to civil liability. Although the state does provide
indemnification for damages against emergency responders, it does not indemnify
hospitals or other institutions.
Though potentially beneficial, sovereign immunity is curbed in many states
through tort claims acts (TCAs). TCAs effectively waive sovereign immunity for
government actors and agents acting within their official capacities. 9 The scope
of states' TCAs varies widely, including elements effecting complete abolition of
sovereign immunity protections, reserving total immunity for specific actors, and
retaining immunity protections with only limited exceptions." Public hospitals
must investigate their state courts' application of sovereign immunity protections
and the scope of any applicable TCAs to determine whether the doctrine might
protect them from potential liability.
The broad spectrum of immunity protections that states provide health care
entities during emergencies is illustrated by the diverse legislation existing in the
three Gulf Coast states most affected by Hurricane Katrina. In Louisiana, state
legislation immunizes hospitals and health care entities from liability resulting from
injury or damage to people or property during a state-declared emergency, except
in cases of gross negligence or willful conduct.13' However, the legislation includes
no specific provision addressing hospital liability for actions of VHPs, so it is
unclear whether courts will interpret this language to include hospital immunity for
VHP negligence. Public hospitals in Mississippi are protected through immunity
provisions for state and political subdivision employees or agents during a state-
upholding sovereign immunity only for county-run hospitals). Irrespective of which governmental
entity runs a hospital, courts are usually reticent to recognize sovereign immunity when the hospital
or its agent has acted with willful or wanton negligence.
127. See, Odom v. Lane, 588 S.E.2d 548 (N.C. App. 2003) (holding that hospital operation is
proprietary function and not a service typically provided by the government, thus foreclosing any
governmental immunity for hospital); see also, Thomas v. Hosp. Auth. of Clarke County, 440 S.E.2d
195 (Ga. 1994).
128. WASH. REv. CODE S 4.92.090 (2005).
129. LEGAL AND REGULATORY ISSUES REPORT, supra note 14, at 45-46.
130. Id.
131. CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUBS. HEALTH, HURRICANE KATRINA RESPONSE: LEGAL
PROTECTIONS FOR VHPS IN ALABAMA, LOUISIANA AND MISSISSIPPI, http://www.publichealthlaw
.net/Research/PDF/Kamina%20-%20AL%20LA%/o2OMS%2OLegal%20Protections.pdf (lastvisited
Apr. 5, 2006).
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declared emergency.'32 Despite the existence of substantial protections for public
hospitals under these circumstances, private hospitals in Mississippi may still face
liability. Moreover, public hospitals may still face substantial liability risk for VHP
negligence related to actions occurring outside a declared emergency. Alabama
provides liability protection to hospitals engaged in emergency management
activities. These protections do not, however, extend to vicarious liability for the
actions of volunteers. 33
As opposed to immunizing health care entities from liability, states could offer
hospitals indemnification for civil liability judgments or settlements resulting from
care provided during declared emergencies."M Indemnification shifts the economic
loss of a court judgment from one party to another, in this case from the hospitals
to the states. However, most state legislation providing indemnity for liability
judgments arising out of public health emergencies is meant to shield individual
VHPs rather than hospitals or other health care entities.'
In addition to state legislation that may offer immunity or indemnification to
hospitals utilizing VHPs, pending federal legislation exemplifies potential
Congressional action that could affect the liability hospitals face regarding VHP use.
The Hurricane Katrina Volunteer Protection Act"'M seeks to immunize from liability
any person or entity who causes injury or loss while voluntarily giving aid to any
individual affected by Hurricane Katrina, provided that their action did not violate
any state or federal law and was not willful, wanton, or criminal.'37 This legislation
would provide liability protection to VHPs and the hospitals in which they are
working but narrowly tailors its immunity to liability arising out of Katrina relief
efforts." Senate Bill 1638, 139 still pending in the U.S. Senate Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions Committee, would have a more lasting effect on liability
resulting from the use of VHPs during future emergencies, but it fails to explicitly
extend immunity to hospitals or other health care entities.'" In the face of the
House bill's narrow application and the Senate bill's silence as to hospital liability for
VHP negligence, it seems unlikely that currently pending federal legislation will
eliminate hospitals' liability risks.
132. Id
133. Id
134. See, LEGAL AND REGULATORY IsSUES REPORT, sapra note 14, at 52.
135. See, id. at 44.
136. Katrina Volunteer Protection Act of 2005, H.R. 3736, 109th Cong. (2005) (the bill has
passed in the House, and is currently in the Senate awaiting a vote).
137. H.R. 3736 MEMORANDUM, supra note 21.
138. Moreover, because laws cannot constitutionally take effect expostfao, this legislation
would only immunize hospitals and VHPs from liability for acts occurring after its passage. Id
139. Hurricane Katrina Emergency Health Workforce Act of 2005, S.B. 1638, 109th Cong.
2005 (introduced before the U.S. Senate on September 8, 2005 and referred to the Committee on
Health, Education, Labor and Pensions on the same date).
140. See, H.R. 3736 MEMORANDUM, spra note 21.
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Overall, the legislative provisions existing and pending on the state and federal
levels provide little liability protection for hospitals utilizing VHPs during
emergencies. Despite the extensive immunity and indemnity provisions drafted
with VHPs in mind, hospitals still suffer from a dearth of liability protections for
their use of those volunteers. Hospitals and other health care organizations may
potentially be exposed to civil liability during emergencies for their own acts and the
acts of their employees, agents, and volunteers even when the VHP who committed
the acts may be individually immune."'I Individual states' immunity and indemnity
provisions may effect a slight reduction of hospital liability risk in certain situations,
but none negate hospitals' risks completely. Hospitals must look to other measures
to proactively reduce their risks in the use of VHPs.
III. PROACTiVE STRATEGIES FOR HOSPITALS TO MANAGE LIABILITY RISKS
Assessing hospital risks of liability for patient harms relating to the use of
VHPs during emergencies is complex. Liability themes like corporate negligence,
vicarious liability, and EMTALA violations have very real applications in non-
emergency circumstances. As the legal landscape changes with the formal
declaration of emergencies, will these themes pervade during disasters to the same
extent that they do during non-emergencies? Will patients, who are potentially
harmed by a VHP's delivery of health care services, find success through judicial or
other remedies for negligent actions (or failures to act) of hospitals or their agents?
Alternatively, will courts reject these claims because care was provided under exigent
circumstances? Will federal or state legislatures bail hospitals out of rising liability
costs via indemnification? Answers to these and other questions in the context of
a large scale public health emergency are difficult to predict. Yet, existing legal
themes, inadequate liability protections, and recent lessons from, the Gulf Coast
region suggest that hospitals must be wary of their potential for liability associated
with the use of VHPs.
Hospitals may seek legislative or regulatory reforms to clarify their
responsibilities or broker better protections (akin to what individual volunteers
enjoy in most states). Such options always exist, but are rife with political and
practical complications. At the core of these complications is the recognition that
hospitals cannot dispense of their community obligations to provide quality health
care services. Liability theories are grounded in the notion that injured individuals
have some recourse for their damages through persons or entities that are at fault.
To encourage physicians and other health care workers to volunteer during
emergencies, government has created numerous protections from liability for
141. These issues are discussed at length in Part II, infra.
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VHPs 42  Similar protections for hospitals may be less palatable within
communities.
Unlike individual volunteers who can temporarily relocate to assist during an
emergency, hospitals, such as those in New Orleans, may find themselves stuck at
the center of a disaster, providing care to as many patients as possible. Other
hospitals may be far removed from the scene of a disaster, yet absorbing new waves
of patients from other facilities. The emergency itself, such as an epidemic avian flu
outbreak, may evolve to impact hospitals in specific regions, effectively transferring
patient burdens from region to region. In each scenario, hospital systems are relied
on to provide care to thousands of existing and new patients. This need to provide
care may be characterized as a duty of government-run hospitals or the business of
private sector operations. In either sector, it is quintessentially an ethical obligation
of hospitals. Stronger liability protections for hospitals may be viewed as
diminishing this obligation to the detriment of individual patients. Conversely,
failing to provide better liability protections may present some hospitals with the
undesirable choice of having to cease operations during emergencies. VHPs may
still be needed anyway to staff field hospitals or establishments taken over by
government, but the ideal scenario is to welcome VHPs into an existing, organized,
functioning health care environment. Most accredited hospitals, even during
emergencies, offer a better environment for VHPs seeking to treat patients than
hastily-organized clinics. Proposals for alternative actions for hospitals to take to
reduce their liabilities will not be quickly resolved. In the interim, a better option
for hospitals is to engage in several proactive strategies to effectively manage their
risks. These include: (1) planning and training to meet surge capacity; (2)
implementing strict credentialing procedures; and (3) divesting responsibility for
VHPs, as explained below.
A. Planning and Training to Meet Surge Capacity
In emergencies and non-emergencies, one of the most effective strategies to
limit liability in hospital settings is to prevent the conditions under which it may
arise. Effective planning can be a preventative remedy for the ills of liability. As
part of national bioterrorism preparedness efforts, public and private sector
hospitals across the nation have developed emergency management plans to sustain
essential operations during emergencies. HRSA has provided millions of dollars to
facilitate hospital planning through its National Bioterrorism Hospital Preparedness
Program.43 Hospitals that engage in advance planning to meet surge capacity in
response to emergencies should specifically recognize the need for VHPs by
142. See, Part II.C. supra.
143. HEALTH REs. & SERVS. AGENCY, NATIONALBIOTERRORISM HOSPITALPREPAREDNESS
PROGRAM, available at http://www.hrsa.gov/bioterrorism/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2006).
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identifying the methods, resources, and ways that VHPs will be recruited, utilized,
and supervised. Among the personnel resources for hospitals' use' are a range of
organized volunteer registries, like ESAR-VHP, as discussed in Part II.B. The
primary objective is to plan in advance for the real-time use of VHPs to ensure the
delivery of adequate care during emergencies. Hospitals should also be informed
of their role in emergency responses through the Federal Response Plan and state
and local emergency response plans. This type of planning and coordination may
lessen potential liability threats by (1) organizing prospective VHPs to enhance
patient treatment and (2) providing an essential reference for the standards of care
that hospitals must adhere to during emergency responses.
Establishing policies and procedures through effective planning, however, is
not enough. To further avoid risks of liability in the use of VHPs, hospitals must
be prepared to implement these policies in accordance with the standards of
practice in the field. This requires ongoing, meaningful training programs for all
employees responsible for emergency management. Training must address the
various elements of the hospital's plan, including the use and administration of
volunteer registries, as well as the hospital staff's supervision of VHPs once they
arrive. Training cannot ensure readiness for all disasters, but it helps establish roles,
responsibilities, and leadership among hospital management, medical personnel and
staff These qualities contribute to the type of environment in which VHPs may be
effectively utilized.
B. Implementing Additional Credentialing Procedures
Volunteer registries like ESAR-VHP are designed to readily provide hospitals
with access to available, pre-vetted VHPs for real-time responses to emergencies.
This service is invaluable. Hospitals do not have adequate time to independently
recruit, validate, and assign VHPs during emergencies. They simply need medical
personnel fast. Yet, in their haste, hospitals must be cautious of the potential for
inaccuracies in VHP.registration data. Their failure to cross-check the credentials
of assigned VHPs may expose them to liability. Regrettably, emergency situations
present opportunities for impostors to attempt to impersonate qualified medical
personnel and provide some level of treatment to patients. In addition to the
criminal acts of a select few, hospitals may mistakenly assign VHPs to functions or
duties that the volunteers are not professionally trained to handle. Resulting lapses
in the provision of patient care would be inexcusable even during emergencies.
Hospitals should thus be prepared to supplement volunteer registries' efforts to
check the qualification of VHPs through additional, on-site credentialing and
privileging procedures. These procedures must be able to expeditiously validate the
qualifications of VHPs specifically assigned to treat patients directly within the
hospital. Specific hospital staff should be pre-designated with responsibility for
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verifying VHP credentials through ESAR-VHP or other resources during
emergencies.
In setting policies and procedures regarding the use of volunteer registries and
VHPs, hospitals must look to their current policies and federal, state, and local laws
to determine the specifics of their exposure to liability. Policies should be designed
to avoid specific liability sources. Standards from the Joint Commission for the
Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations JCAHO) for disaster privileging may
serve as an important guide for appropriate credentialing procedures for VHPs. t '
Hospital personnel who are routinely responsible for granting staff privileges should
review the policies and protocols for granting disaster privileges to ensure that they
meet quality of care standards. This may include establishing minimum procedural
requirements for any VHPs granted hospital privileges during emergencies.
C. Divesting Responsibility for VHPs
As noted in Part II.C, statutory and other legal mechanisms do not begin to
exculpate hospitals from various types of liability related to the use of VHPs during
emergencies. However, hospitals can divest some of their responsibility for the
actions of VHPs through binding memoranda, informed consent documents, or
other contracts. Memoranda of understanding between regional hospitals regarding
the sharing of resources during emergencies are an effective contractual tool. Many
hospitals enter into these agreements to authorize the sharing of medical staff,
supplies, and equipment during emergencies when each of these resources may be
limited in supply. Prioritization for the use of these resources typically lies with the
hospital at risk. MOUs not only involve the exchange of essential resources, but
also frequently address the allocation of liability regarding the use of resources.
They may, for example, indicate that hospitals hosting VHPs will not assume
liability for their negligence. Though such agreements may be challenged in court
by aggrieved patients, their attempt to spell out the nature of a hospital's
responsibility for the actions of VHPs in advance may help to reduce the potential
for the hospital's corporate negligence or vicarious liability in the administration of
volunteer programs. Conversely, these agreements may adversely affect the
willingness of VHPs to serve at the hospital's request.
Additional contractual tools may be used to notify patients and VHPs of the
nature of their own risks during emergencies, which can diminish their expectation
of the hospital's potential liability. The Center for Law and the Pubkc's Health has
prepared a draft model "ESAR-VHP Volunteer Agreement' 4 that VHPs might
144. See, JCAHO OFFICIAL HANDBOOK, supra note 43.
145. THE CTR. FOR LAW & THE PUB. HEALTH, HRSA EMERGENCY SYSTEM FOR ADVANCE
REGISTRATION OF VOLUNTEER HEALTH PROFESSIONALS (ESAR-VHP)-LEGAL AND REGULA-
TORY ISSUES, ESAR-VHP VOLUNTEERAGREEMENT, available at http://www.publichealhlaw.net/
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be asked to execute prior to their participation as a volunteer in a hospital or other
setting. Among its provisions, VHPs assert that they will:
" Perform volunteer services and activities under the terms, conditions,
-and general direction of the sponsoring health care organization;
" Waive any claims for compensation from the sponsoring organization
for any services performed related to volunteer services;
" Be subject to state regulations concerning Standards of Conduct and
Conflicts of Interest;
" Be eligible for coverage under any identified applicable immunity statutes
for any damages or injuries that may arise from their volunteer services;
" Maintain current health professional licensure, certification or
registration; and
* Be responsible for any actions that are not directly related to the
performance of volunteer services.
Collectively, these contractual promises between the hospital and VHPs set
reasonable expectations as to the nature of the volunteer's own liability as well as
his or her expected duties to help limit the hospital's liability (e.g., maintaining
current licensure and assuming responsibility for his or her own actions)."4
Hospitals may also prepare for an emergency by drafting specific informed
consent forms for incoming patients. In addition to standard informed consent
documents that spell out the terms and risks of admission and treatment at the
hospital, these forms could explain some of the additional risks of treatment during
emergencies (to the extent these can be assessed). Emergency informed consent
documents might, for example, include simple, plain language provisions addressing
(1) altered standards of care during times of triage; (2) resulting diminutions in
quality of care as compared with non-emergency scenarios; (3) differences in
hospital treatment practices and procedures during emergencies; (4) agreements to
seek arbitration to resolve any claims prior to filing actions in court; and,
importantly, (5) the possibility that patients may be treated by VHPs that may not
be licensed or credentialed in the state, or have regular privileges at the hospital.
The effect of this latter clause in an emergency informed consent form is to seek the
patient's agreement in advance of accepting treatment from VHPs.
Patient execution of specific informed consent forms that include these
provisions may not fully insulate the hospital from all liability regarding the use of
Research/PDF/ESAR%20VHP/o2OAgreement.pdf (last accessed Nov. 18, 2005).
146. See, supra note 103 (discussing the finding in Daring 211 N.E.2d 253, that the hospital's
contract denying that a physician was to be considered an "employee," precluded liability for the
physician's action on the basis of vicarious liability, although the hospital was ultimately found
liable via the doctrine of corporate negligence).
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VHPs. However, they serve, at the least, to notify patients that it may not be
possible to provide standard treatment regimens during emergencies. In many
cases, this may be immediately obvious to patients based on the nature of the
emergency. Yet it may help to specifically inform patients of their own increased
risks through more formal means. Of course, execution of specific informed
consent forms for all presenting patients may not be possible during emergencies.
By no means would the failure of a patient to execute this kind of agreement be
acceptable grounds for denying emergency treatment. Ideally, the forms would
allow most patients to assess and understand their risks and to decide whether to
accept treatment under altered standards of care.
IV. CONCLUSION
Maintaining an adequate standard of care during emergencies is an enormous
challenge for hospitals. The impact of Hurricanes Katrina, Rita, and Wilma on the
Gulf Coast states demonstrated the potential for short- and long-term consequences
for hospitals, especially in flood-ravaged New Orleans. Hospitals across the region
experienced immediate increases in the numbers of patients coupled, in some
locations, with the flight of some existing medical personnel seeking to avoid the
disaster itself. As a result, many hospitals scrambled to fill gaps in essential medical
personnel through the use of VHPs. Though risks to patients posed by the
hospital's use of volunteers can be minimized, the specter of liability for hospitals
still looms. Theories of corporate negligence and vicarious liability may apply to
hospitals in times of emergency just as in non-emergencies. Statutory or other legal
protections from liability claims against hospitals are not comprehensive. Hospitals
may thus be uniquely exposed to potential claims of injured patients for damages
if VHPs are negligent in the provision of care. Accordingly, hospitals should
consider implementing policies and procedures designed to manage risks before and
during emergencies. These proactive measures may not only reduce potential
liability arising out of the use of VHPs during emergencies, but they can also
improve patient care by facilitating the deployment of essential medical personnel
when and where they are most needed.
